Collective Dominance - Merger Control on Oligopolistic Markets

Abstract

Collective Dominance - Merger Control on Oligopolistic Markets This thesis discusses how the European Merger Control Regulation, 4064/89, is applied to different situations of collective dominance. The concept of collective dominance applies to three sets of legal provisions; the Articles 81 and 82 EC and the Merger Regulation. Comparisons are made between these provisions, although the focus is on merger appraisals in oligopolistic markets. Initially I explain the basic theories of oligopolistic markets, unilateral and co-ordinated effects as well as the outcome of collective dominance, that is tacit collusion and parallel behaviour. Furthermore, the thesis examines how far the concept of collective dominance can be stretched by studying relevant case law, such as the Kali & Salz- case and Gencor v. Commission. Finally, the criteria of collective dominance are discussed, where the decision in Airtors/First Choice serves as an example of the Commission's reasoning when assessing mergers on oligopolistic markets. Carina Olsson