The legal status of the Revised Code 3.1 in relation to the Islamic Republic of Iran

Abstract

The proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most serious and challenging security issues of today. In September 2009 reports of a newly discovered nuclear facility, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, in the desert near the city of Qom again raised the question if Iran is in compliance with the obligations under its Safeguards Agreement. The Safeguards Agreement was concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with the Non Proliferation Treaty in 1974. According to the IAEA Iran is bound by the modified rules of the Safeguards Agreement, called the “Revised Code 3.1”, and therefore should have declared the Fordow facility at the time of the decision to construct the facility. Iran, on the other hand, claims to be in full compliance with its Safeguard Agreement, considering, as the Iranian government argues, that Iran is not bound by the changes made to these particular rules in 1992.

The paper seeks to provide a basis for understanding the problematic from an international legal perspective, using international treaty law as tool of analysis. For the interpretation of Iran’s rights and obligations in its relationship to the IAEA the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is applied on the Iran’s Safeguards Agreement. It is concluded that Iran’s argumentation lacks credibility and that the Fordow facility consequently should have been declared in accordance with the position of the IAEA.

Furthermore, the report discusses the overall legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime in general and the (questionable) application of the non-proliferation rules in relation to Iran in particular. Iran’s obligations under the NPT are put in relation to Nuclear Weapon States’ commitment to disarmament. Nuclear Weapon States are criticized for not keeping their part of the deal, and thereby undermining the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime.