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dc.contributor.authorTengblad, Stefanswe
dc.date.accessioned2006-12-08swe
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-13T12:57:54Z
dc.date.available2007-02-13T12:57:54Z
dc.date.issued2002swe
dc.identifier.issn1400-4801swe
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/3044
dc.description.abstractBased on a direct observation study of eight CEOs for large corporations, this paper examines how control is exercised in the era of financial transparency. In particular, the link between corporate governance and managerial work is investigated. The CEOs felt accountable for the company performance to exchange market actors. Inside their own companies the CEOs governed through setting and maintaining expectations rather then relying on centralised decision-making and giving instructions. Subordinate managers were given discretion, but their performance was closely watched and they had to fulfil expectations. This resulted in self-sacrificing work in the management cadre but also in conformity and non-constructive communication. In the end of the paper, the effects of managing by expectations are discussed with regard to issues about governance ethics, organizational learning and work balance.swe
dc.format.extent27 pagesswe
dc.format.extent146333 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenswe
dc.relation.ispartofseriesGRI reports, nr 2002:9swe
dc.subjectmanagerial workswe
dc.subjectmanagerial behaviourswe
dc.subjectcorporate governanceswe
dc.subjectexpectationsswe
dc.subjectaccountabilityswe
dc.titleExpectations and accountability in managerial workswe
dc.type.svepReportswe
dc.contributor.departmentGothenburg Research Instituteswe
dc.gup.originGöteborg University. School of Business, Economics and Lawswe
dc.gup.epcid1303swe
dc.subject.svepBusiness studiesswe


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