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dc.contributor.authorJohansson, Erik
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-28T10:58:13Z
dc.date.available2015-05-28T10:58:13Z
dc.date.issued2008-08
dc.identifier.issn1653-8919
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/39144
dc.description.abstractNew modern aid was initiated during the latter half of the 1990s by most of the leading actors within the international donor community to make the whole aid-procedure more effective, more lucid and more on the receiving states’ conditions. Budget Support is a tool within this “partnership-aid” transformation where the distribution goes directly to the receiver state’s governmental budget and thus strengthens the institutions of the state. As the governmental institutions gain more power, other actors might gain less power than before. It is problematic if Civil Society gains less power because one prerequisite to obtain Budget Support is to have a well functioning Civil Society. So if Budget Support leads to a weaker Civil Society it undermines the initial prerequisites to obtain Budget Support in the first place. The core of this thesis is to see whether this possible paradox is a reality. The target for this thesis is Uganda, a country which has been a pioneer in implementing new aid initiatives by the donor community, with an elaborate Budget Support framework. The study focuses on effects from Budget Support on Anti-Corruption Organizations (AC-CSOs) within Civil Society. To make the effects visual, the AC-CSOs’ relation to donors and the Government of Uganda (GoU) after the Budget Support implementation is investigated. Qualitative research interviews are made with 16 AC-CSOs. The findings show that most of the interviewed AC-CSOs are marginalized by the GoU after Budget Support implementation and almost half of them are marginalized by donors. Thus, Budget Support tends to be a part of the marginalization process for AC-CSOs. The direct distribution of funds to the GoU increases the government’s power and the process tends to lead to a position/object relation with AC-CSOs. Also, donors tend not to give AC-CSOs the support to stop this process. In addition, donors favour Watchdog Organizations over Service Delivery Organizations. As Civil Society tends to be weakened with Budget Support implementation, the structure of Budget Support could be considered as unsustainable in Uganda.sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperssv
dc.relation.ispartofseries2008:19sv
dc.relation.urihttp://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1350/1350671_2008_19_johansson.pdfsv
dc.subjectbudget supportsv
dc.subjectcivil societysv
dc.subjectanti-corruption organizationssv
dc.subjectgovernmentsv
dc.subjectdonorssv
dc.subjectUgandasv
dc.titleThe Partnership Paradox? Budget Support Effects on Anti-Corruption Organizations in Ugandasv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.contributor.organizationQoG Institutesv


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