Economic Determinants and Consequences of Political Institutions
Abstract
This thesis is comprised of four empirical essays on the economic
determinants and consequences of political institutions. It opens with a broad perspective on the link between the state throughout history and the past and current
economic performance of nations. The rest of the chapters focus on a particular form of
institutional failure - "endemic corruption" - with illustrations of its harmful impact on
key development areas: human capital formation and democracy. More specifically,
chapters two and three identify causal links between public sector wages, monitoring and incentives and corruption in education. The final chapter examines the clientelistic structure of electoral politics showing that local politicians in can influence national
elections by vote buying and electoral fraud.
Parts of work
Oana Borcan, Mikael Lindahl, Andreea Mitrut, The impact of an unexpected wage cut on corruption: Evidence from a “Xeroxed” exam, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 120, December 2014, Pages 32-47, ISSN 0047-2727, doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.003
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
University
Göteborgs universitet. Handelshögskolan
Institution
Department of Economics ; Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik
Disputation
Fredagen den 6 november 2015, kl. 13.00, SKF-salen, School of Business, Economics and Law, Vasagatan 1, Gothenburg
Date of defence
2015-11-06
oana.borcan@economics.gu.se
Date
2015-10-15Author
Borcan, Oana
Keywords
political institutions
state history
corruption
education
voting
Publication type
Doctoral thesis
ISBN
978-91-88199-06-5 (PDF)
978-91-88199-05-8 (Tryckt)
Series/Report no.
Ekonomiska Studier
225
Language
eng