Economic Determinants and Consequences of Political Institutions
Sammanfattning
This thesis is comprised of four empirical essays on the economic
determinants and consequences of political institutions. It opens with a broad perspective on the link between the state throughout history and the past and current
economic performance of nations. The rest of the chapters focus on a particular form of
institutional failure - "endemic corruption" - with illustrations of its harmful impact on
key development areas: human capital formation and democracy. More specifically,
chapters two and three identify causal links between public sector wages, monitoring and incentives and corruption in education. The final chapter examines the clientelistic structure of electoral politics showing that local politicians in can influence national
elections by vote buying and electoral fraud.
Delarbeten
Oana Borcan, Mikael Lindahl, Andreea Mitrut, The impact of an unexpected wage cut on corruption: Evidence from a “Xeroxed” exam, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 120, December 2014, Pages 32-47, ISSN 0047-2727, doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.003
Examinationsnivå
Doctor of Philosophy
Universitet
Göteborgs universitet. Handelshögskolan
Institution
Department of Economics ; Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik
Disputation
Fredagen den 6 november 2015, kl. 13.00, SKF-salen, School of Business, Economics and Law, Vasagatan 1, Gothenburg
Datum för disputation
2015-11-06
E-post
oana.borcan@economics.gu.se
Datum
2015-10-15Författare
Borcan, Oana
Nyckelord
political institutions
state history
corruption
education
voting
Publikationstyp
Doctoral thesis
ISBN
978-91-88199-06-5 (PDF)
978-91-88199-05-8 (Tryckt)
Serie/rapportnr.
Ekonomiska Studier
225
Språk
eng