dc.contributor.author | Zhang, Nan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-06T10:40:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-07-06T10:40:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-03 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1653-8919 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2077/45034 | |
dc.description.abstract | Does democracy reduce corruption? While much recent research has focused on the ability of citizens
in democracies to hold politicians accountable through regular elections, other institutional
features of democracy such as a free press and independent civil society may also strengthen accountability
by lowering the costs of monitoring and sanctioning malfeasance. Using an original
dataset of high-profile corruption cases across 154 countries, I find a strong positive relationship
between democratic institutions and anti-corruption enforcement. Moreover, this relationship obtains
after restricting attention to states without free and fair elections, suggesting that even in
countries where citizens cannot reliably exercise accountability through the ballot, liberalization of
the civic sphere can help hold malfeasance in check. | sv |
dc.language.iso | eng | sv |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Papers | sv |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2016:5 | sv |
dc.relation.uri | http://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1567/1567568_2016_5_zhang.pdf | sv |
dc.title | Democratic advantages in corruption control. New Evidence from Anti-Corruption Cases across 154 Countries | sv |
dc.type | Text | sv |
dc.type.svep | article, other scientific | sv |
dc.contributor.organization | QoG Institute | sv |