The Dual Nature of Harm - In Defence of the Disjunctive View -

Abstract

Much of the debate about the nature of harm regard the standard comparative views and the alternative non-comparative views. The former claim that harm always involves a subject that is made worse off. The latter acknowledges a more absolute understanding of harm, as a subject that is caused to be in a bad state. The virtues and vices of these views have been wildly debated. Even thought both notions have intuitive support, they also have serious problems. It has been suggested quite recently that the nature of harm is best understood as a combination of a comparative and a non-comparative condition - a disjunctive view. The thought is that the disjunctivist can account for many of the cases that strict views struggle with, since the two senses complement each other. However, there are some new potential problems with combining the two senses of harm. The disjunctive view has been questioned on the grounds of being ad hoc, incapable of fully solving the Non-Identity problem and contradicting Parfit's No-Difference View. This essay addresses the mentioned worries and explores possible defence strategies.