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dc.contributor.authorBroms, Rasmus
dc.date.accessioned2019-08-09T10:51:02Z
dc.date.available2019-08-09T10:51:02Z
dc.date.issued2018-12
dc.identifier.issn1653-8919
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/61440
dc.description.abstractElectoral accountability is widely considered an essential element for ascertaining institutional quality. Nevertheless, and contrary to this notion, a growing body of empirical research finds weak or limited support for the notion that voters actually punish political corruption, a central but partial aspect of institutional quality. Instead, I introduce the concept of institutional performance voting, capturing institutional quality as a whole. Using a novel dataset on performance audit reports in Swedish municipalities, I find that voters punish mayoral parties responsible for institutional dysfunction.sv
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paperssv
dc.relation.ispartofseries2018:11sv
dc.relation.urihttps://qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1709/1709807_2018_11_broms.pdfsv
dc.titleThe electoral consequences of institutional failure: A comparative study of audits, rulers, and voters in Swedish municipalitiessv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.type.sveparticle, other scientificsv
dc.contributor.organizationQoG Institutesv


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