Fri vilja?

Abstract

This thesis, Fri vilja?, deals with one of the classical issues in philosophy: the problem of Free Will. My aim is to dissolve, rather than to solve, the standard formulation of the problem by arguing that problems of this kind seem to arise only by presupposing what is illegitimate or at least mistaken. Chapter one starts with a discussion about the relation between everyday problems concerning freedom and philosophical reasoning about Free Will. In an everyday sense we all know what it is to be free. The questions we have do not ordinarily put in doubt that we ever are free, but are questions about how free we are in specific situations, what we can do to rid ourselves of different constraints to our freedom, and in what degree we are responsible for what we do. But in our everyday experience of ourselves as agents lies the seed to a general questioning about our ability to be free at all, and hence about our ability to act or to be responsible. For instance we talk about Fate or Chance, about our lives not being under our control – either in parts or not at all. But if we never are free, the concept of freedom, as well as the concept of action, dissolves. We would be like marionettes or people in a movie; we would simply react to forces beyond our control, or move through predestined patterns of behaviour that only seem like actions, but really are nothing of the kind.