| dc.description.abstract | This thesis is an attempt to contribute to the understanding of the landscape of artificial intelligence (AI), human cognition, and cognitive liberty, set in the context of contemporary life. I am exploring if there is a need to rethink the protection of human cognition, provided by the international human rights framework and if that framework is elastic enough to be able to provide sufficient protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life.
I suggest that turning to a posthuman understanding of the world can provide new terminologies and new understandings that can be helpful in understanding new human living conditions in which AI constitutes integrate parts. I am, therefore, in light of a posthuman understanding of the world, analysing how relevant kinds of AI are affecting human cognition. A posthuman understanding of the world could lead to an understanding that posthuman rights are necessary. I do, however, suggest that the concept of human rights can have a desirable function in human society and am therefore not proposing posthuman rights. My suggestion is rather, that human rights, can be rethought in light of a posthuman understanding of how AI affects human cognition. Based on these explorations and analyses I suggest that the relevant kinds of AI are affecting human cognition in new ways that alter common human vulnerability and makes human cognition vulnerable. Since protection of human cognition, as a common human interest that is vulnerable and necessary for humans to be agents, can be argued to be a common human interest that should be protected by human rights, the introduction of AI entails a need for rethinking protection of human cognition in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. I am, therefore, analysing the concept of cognitive liberty in the contemporary context of AI influencing human life to understand if the international human rights framework is elastic enough to adapt already recognized rights so that they can protect human cognition in this contemporary context, and if cognitive liberty, as a new human right, can be justified. I am arguing that already recognized rights cannot, in line with rules of interpretation, be interpreted so that they can accommodate such protection and, thus, that the international human rights framework is not elastic enough to adapt already recognized rights to the contemporary context of AI influencing human life. I am, further, suggesting that a new human right guaranteeing protection of human cognitive liberty ought to be considered by the international community. | sv |
