• English
    • svenska
  • svenska 
    • English
    • svenska
  • Logga in
Redigera dokument 
  •   Startsida
  • Faculty of Social Science / Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten
  • Department of Political Science / Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
  • Doctoral Theses / Doktorsavhandlingar Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
  • Redigera dokument
  •   Startsida
  • Faculty of Social Science / Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten
  • Department of Political Science / Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
  • Doctoral Theses / Doktorsavhandlingar Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
  • Redigera dokument
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Principled Principals? Voter Responses to Public Goods Provision

Sammanfattning
Do voters in developing democracies reward incumbents for public goods provision? One of the basic assumptions of democratic theory is that voters use elections to punish and reward incumbents for their performance in office. However, many accounts characterize elections in developing democracies as being dominated by clientelism and vote buying, suggesting that voters do not base their vote on public service provision. This dissertation proposes a somewhat more optimistic picture. The results highlight that voters in developing democracies are willing to reward their representatives for effective public goods provision. However, the findings also suggest that societies can be trapped in an electoral equilibrium with low public goods provision because voters have pessimistic expectations about the effectiveness of public goods policies and are not able to attribute public goods outcomes to the efforts of their representatives. While pessimistic expectations lead voters to not reward incumbents for investment in public goods policies when outcomes are uncertain, failure of attribution leads to low electoral returns even for effective public goods provision. Policy instruments that assign responsibilities to politicians during policy implementation can increase attributability by enabling incumbents to credibly claim credit for public service provision or by making politicians’ efforts observable to voters.
Delarbeten
1. Hartmann, F. (2022). Do Voters Reward Relief Over Prevention? Evidence from Preferences for Disaster Policies. Unpublished manuscript.
 
2. Hartmann, F. (2022). The Politics of Implementation: When Does Public Goods Provision Influence Incumbent Voting? Unpublished manuscript.
 
3. Xezonakis, G., & Hartmann, F. (2020). Economic downturns and the Greek referendum of 2015: Evidence using night-time light data. European Union Politics, 21(3), 361-382. https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116520924477
 
Examinationsnivå
Doctor of Philosophy
Universitet
University of Gothenburg. Faculty of Social Sciences
Göteborgs universitet. Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten
Institution
Department of Political Science ; Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Disputation
Fredagen den 25 mars 2022, kl. 13.15 i Torgny Segerstedtssalen, Universitetets huvudbyggnad, Vasaparken 1, Göteborg.
Datum för disputation
2022-03-25
E-post
felix.hartmann@gu.se
URL:
https://hdl.handle.net/2077/70600
Samlingar
  • Doctoral Theses / Doktorsavhandlingar Statsvetenskapliga institutionen
Fil(er)
Abstract (1.631Mb)
Thesis frame (2.168Mb)
Datum
2022-03-02
Författare
Hartmann, Felix
Nyckelord
Public Goods Provision
Electoral Accountability
Voting Behavior
Publikationstyp
Doctoral thesis
ISBN
978-91-8009-685-0
978-91-8009-686-7
Serie/rapportnr.
Göteborg Studies in Politics
173
Språk
eng
Metadata
Visa fullständig post

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
gup@ub.gu.se | Teknisk hjälp
Theme by 
Atmire NV
 

 

Visa

VisaSamlingarI datumordningFörfattareTitlarNyckelordDenna samlingI datumordningFörfattareTitlarNyckelord

Mitt konto

Logga inRegistrera dig

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2016  DuraSpace
gup@ub.gu.se | Teknisk hjälp
Theme by 
Atmire NV