Normative Realism without Objective Values

Abstract

In this thesis, I question whether a newer kind of view, the presentationalist view, should be considered a normative realism. The view, proposed by Eklund (2017), claims that while there are (non-deflationary) true normative statements, there are no normative entities in the world making them true. The presentationalist view as spelled out by Eklund both agrees and disagrees with our common understanding of normative realism, so there is an open question of whether is should be considered as such. The thesis begins by discussing different versions of the presentationalist view, then different meanings of ‘normative realism’. We find that there are different senses in which a view can be considered a normative realist view and in some of these senses, the different versions of presentationalism fail to be a normative realist view. But as it is shown, there is one sense in which a presentationalist view can be a normative realist view: by being a realism in at least one normative discourse. The thesis ends by questioning whether a presentationalist view can be a normative realist view in this sense by discussing whether there can be a moral realist presentationalist view.