Labor Force Decisions to Migrate

dc.contributor.authorAccinelli, Elvio
dc.contributor.authorCarrera, Edgar J.S.
dc.contributor.authorSalas, Osvaldo
dc.contributor.organizationGöteborgs universitetsv
dc.contributor.organizationUniversity of Gothenburgsv
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-28T15:52:30Z
dc.date.available2011-10-28T15:52:30Z
dc.date.issued2011-10-28
dc.description.abstractThis paper works on the idea that migration is explained as the result of an imitation process. So, we develop a suitable model for the study of migration driven by imitative behavior, i.e. migrate if the others are doing. We show that there exists a threshold value for the impact of emigration in the birth country and in the host country. Finally, we oer some elements of economic policy to avoid the negative externalities that migration may cause.sv
dc.format.extent15 pagessv
dc.identifier.issn1651-5242
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2077/27928
dc.language.isoengsv
dc.publisherSchool of Public Administration/Förvaltningshögskolansv
dc.relation.ispartofseriesSchool of Public Administration Working Papers Seriessv
dc.relation.ispartofseries18sv
dc.subjectHarris-TOdaro modelsv
dc.subjectmigrant behaviorsv
dc.subjectproduction complementaritysv
dc.subjectreplicator dynamicssv
dc.subjectsocial welfaresv
dc.titleLabor Force Decisions to Migratesv
dc.typeTextsv
dc.type.svepreportsv

Files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
gupea_2077_27928_1.pdf
Size:
661.2 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
SPA Working Paper 18

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
4.68 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description: