Collective Dominance in E.C. Merger Control: An Analysis of Legal and Economic Arguments

Abstract

Abstract This essay analyses how the concept of collective dominance is applied in the case-law of E.C. merger control. The method used in the analysis is to investigate the legal arguments that are applied in the assessment of collective dominance and to discuss how they can be understood in the economic context of every case at issue. Thus, the starting platform in the analysis is a legal one. The economic theories taken up in this essay are intended to provide a common understanding of the economics behind the legal concept of collective dominance. The theories are considered as a whole, even though a structural and a behavioural (game-theoretical) approach is distinguished. An important conclusion drawn from the analysis in the essay is that an understanding of the relation between law and economics is essential for the collective dominance appraisal. In this relation law takes precedence over economics, but as a paradox, like it may appear, a high legal standard in merger control is directly connected to a high economic standard. Sökord: collective dominance, oligopolistic dominance, joint dominance, E.C. merger control, Air Tours/First Choice, Kali & Salz, Merger Regulation.