MPs, Clientelism, and Collective Goods

Abstract

The present analysis indicates that MPs in Ghana's young democracy has begun to act on the implications of this accountability and that voters in this African country do evaluate their political leaders not only on personal and clientelistic goods but also on provision of small and large-scale collective goods. In effect and without necessarily thinking of it this way, citizens in Ghana are demanding greater impartiality not only from the bureaucracy in its implementation of public policy, but also from legislators and they use the electoral mechanism to achieve it. MPs in Ghana clearly differ in how much they provide quality of government as impartiality. It is also clear that voters in this country see the difference and put some value on impartially provided goods. To what extent pressures from voters will induce politicians in new democracies such as Ghana to further increase the quality of government rather than the provision of partially distributed personal and clientelistic goods remains to be established by future research.